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Misapplication of the Public Trust Doctrine
in Michigan
CARL SHADI PAGANELLI*
NATURALI vero iure communia sunt omnium haec: aqua profluens,
aer et mare et litora maris, quasi mari accessoria. Nemo igitur ad litus
maris accedere prohibetur, dum tamen villis et tedificiis abstineat, quia
litora non sunt iure gentium communia sicut et mare. Immo cedificia, si
in mari sive in litore posita fuerint, cedificantium sunt de iure gentium.
-B racton'
INTRODUCTION
In its recent decision in Glass v. Goeckel, the Michigan Supreme
Court opened to the public almost two thousand miles of formerly
private land along the shores of Lake Michigan and Lake Huron.' The
* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law; M.A., Columbia
University; B.A., University of California, Berkeley. The author wishes to thank Professor Brian Gray
and the editors and staff of the Hastings Law Journal for their contributions to this Note. All errors,
infelicities, and shortcomings are, of course, the author's alone.
I. HENRY DE BRACTON, DE LEGIBUS ET CONSUETUDINIBus ANGLIAE, II. 39-40 (George Woodbine
ed., Yale Univ. Press, 1942) (1569)), available at http://hlsl5.law.harvard.edu/bracton/UnframedLatin/
v2/i9.htm, translated in BRACTON: ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND (Samuel E. Thorne trans.,
1977) ("By natural law these are common to all: running water, air, the sea, and the shores of the sea,
as though accessories of the sea. No one therefore is forbidden access to the seashore, provided he
keeps away from houses and buildings [built there], for by the jus gentium shores are not common to
all in the sense that the sea is, but buildings built there, whether in the sea or on the shore, belong by
the jus gentium to those who build them."). Bracton (also known as Henry de Bracton) was a medieval
English jurist who lived circa 1210-1268. Harvard Law School Library, Bracton Online,
http://hlsl5.law.harvard.edu/bracton/Common/index.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2007). In Roman law the
jus gentium (or jus inter gentes) was "[t]he body of law, taken to be common to all civilized peoples."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 877 (8th ed. 2004).
2. 703 N.W.2d 58 (Mich. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1340 (2006); Dave Eggert, Michigan
Supreme Court Considers Beach Rights, DETNEWS.COM, Mar. io, 2005, http://www.detnews.com/2oo5/
metrO/05o3/IO/Co7-I 12832.htm. The case was the subject of national judicial and media attention. See,
e.g., Eggert, supra. Before it was argued in Michigan, representatives from the Michigan legislature,
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court based its decision on the public trust doctrine, under which "the
state, as sovereign, has an obligation to protect and preserve the waters
of the Great Lakes and the lands beneath them for the public."3 The
Michigan Supreme Court's use of the public trust doctrine is but another
example of the long-standing common-law tradition of "creative judicial
misunderstanding" of Roman law.' The court legitimized its application
of the public trust on the doctrine's supposed Roman law underpinnings.
Part I of this note briefly traces the origins of the public trust doctrine in
the common law. Part II argues that Glass worked a change in Michigan
common law, contrary to the reasonable expectations of property
owners. Part III explains how judicial action like that in Glass effects a
taking of private property for public use without just compensation.
While the misunderstandings underlying the historical origins of public
trust doctrine do not justify abandoning it, uncritical application of the
doctrine can lead to unconstitutional effects.
I. THE ORIGINS OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
The public trust doctrine has long been recognized as a means of
expanding the public's rights over what would otherwise be private land
on the foreshore of navigable bodies of water.5 That the public trust
doctrine reflects a misunderstanding of Roman law is not a new idea:
Patrick Deveney advanced it in the 1970s,6 perhaps to counter the
growing influence and use of the doctrine at the time. The United States
Supreme Court adopted the public trust doctrine according to the
English common law of the sea, but has enhanced and expanded its reach
state administrative agencies, state and local property rights groups, and environmental groups filed
amicus briefs. Glass, 703 N.W.2d at 6o-6i. The Michigan Attorney General and Solicitor General filed
an amicus brief on behalf of the Department of Environmental Quality and the Department of
Natural Resources. Id. at 60. Other amicus briefs were filed by the Michigan Senate Democratic
Caucus; thirty-nine state representatives; the Michigan Land Use Institute; Defenders of Property
Rights; Save Our Shoreline and Great Lakes Coalition, Inc.; Michigan Chamber of Commerce;
National Federation of Independent Business Legal Foundation; Michigan Bankers Association;
Michigan Hotel, Motel, and Resort Association; Tip of the Mitt Watershed Council; National Wildlife
Federation and Michigan United Conservation Clubs. Id. at 6o-6I. The Glass decision has also been
the subject of subsequent commentary. See, e.g., Eric Nelson, The Public Trust Doctrine and the Great
Lakes: Glass v. Goeckel, ii ALB. L. ENVTL. OUTLOOK J. 131 (2oo6); R. Craig Hupp, Where is the
Water's Edge?, 84 MiCH. B.J. 40 (2005).
3. Glass, 703 N.W.2d at 64.
4. Patrick Deveney, Title, Jus Publicum, and the Public Trust: An Historical Analysis, I SEA
GRANT L.J. 13, 39 (1976). Deveney uses this phrase in a different context, but it is an apt description of
the transformation of the meaning of the term "jus publicum" as it relates to the public trust doctrine.
5. See Deveney, supra note 4, at 36-66. The two principal cases establishing the public trust
doctrine in the United States are Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. i, 53 (N.J. 1821) (holding that the public
trust concept applied to the grants of land Charles II made to his brother James in what would become
New York and New Jersey) and Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 463-64 (1892)
(holding that a state could not grant or surrender control of that which it holds in trust for the people
of that state, namely the state's navigable waters and the lands below them).
6. Deveney, supra note 4.
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over the years.7 Since Michigan has long held that "the common law of
the seas applies to the Great Lakes,"8 it too applies the public trust
doctrine to the shores of the Great Lakes.9 "The state serves, in effect, as
the trustee of public rights in the Great Lakes for fishing, hunting, and
boating for commerce or pleasure."'" The Michigan court is not alone in
giving credence to the Roman origins of the public trust doctrine.
Professor Sax has argued that:
Long ago, there developed in the law of Roman Empire a legal
theory known as the "doctrine of the public trust." It was founded
upon the very sensible idea that certain common property, such as
rivers, the seashore, and the air were held by the government in
trusteeship for the free and unimpeded use of the general public."
Michigan traces its sovereignty over the Great Lakes back to the
Northwest Territories, which were ceded to the United States by Virginia
in 1784, and from Virginia back to the English Crown.'2 The United
States Supreme Court held that: "[W]hen the Revolution took place, the
people of each state became themselves sovereign; and in that character,
[held] the absolute right to all their navigable waters, and the soil under
them for their own common use," and that "absolute right" was the same
as the King of England's.'3 In discussing the public trust doctrine, the
Court explained that under the common law of the sea,
both the title and the dominion of the sea, and of rivers and arms of the
sea, where the tide ebbs and flows, and of all the lands below high
water mark, within the jurisdiction of the Crown of England, are in the
King.... [T]he title, jus privatum, in such lands.., belongs to the King
as the sovereign; and the dominion thereof, jus publicum, is vested in
him as the representative of the nation and for the public benefit.'4
The august antecedents of the public trust doctrine are said to be the
Roman law principles jus privatum and jus publicum, which American
courts have used to define and limit private and public rights in real
property. 5 The Michigan Supreme Court's explanation of these concepts
7. See e.g., Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 284-85 (1997).
8. Glass, 7o3 N.W.2d at 64; accord Hilt v. Weber, 288 N.W. i59, i65 (Mich. 1930); People v.
Silberwood, 67 N.W. lO87, iO88-89 (Mich. 1896).
9. Ill. Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 437; Glass, 703 N.W.2d at 64; see Nedtweg v. Wallace, 2o8 N.W. 51,
52-55 (Mich. 1926); State v. Venice of Am. Land Co., 125 N.W. 770, 776 (Mich. i9IO); Silberwood, 67
N.W. at io88-89.
io. Glass, 703 N.W.2d at 64-65.
II. JOSEPH L. SAX, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT 163-64 (1971); accord JOSEPH L. SAX, The Public
Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (970);
JOSEPH L. SAX, Liberating the Public Trust Doctrine from Its Historical Shackles, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
185 (I980).
12. Glass, 703 N.W.2d at 87.
13. Martin v. Lessee of William C.H. Wadell, 41 U.S. 367,410,413-14 (1842).
14. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. I, 11 (1894).
15. E.g., Glass, 703 N.W.2d at 65. Raleigh Ave. Beach Ass'n v. Atlantis Beach Club, Inc., 879
A.2d 112, 120 (N.J. 2005), which was decided on July 26, 2oo5, also turned to what it referred to as
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is typical: "Jus publicum refers to public rights in navigable waters and
the land covered by those waters; jus privatum, in contrast, refers to
private property rights held subject to the public trust."' 6 The court cites
Black's Law Dictionary as support.'7
It is worth noting two points at the outset. First, the difference
between jus publicum and jus privatum was probably of no import to
Roman lawyers." Moreover, the only surviving Roman definition of jus
publicum has nothing to do with public ownership of land or resources.'9
The terms jus privatum and jus publicum appear together in only two
surviving texts, neither of which have anything to do with or shed any
light on the public trust doctrine." Second, Roman law never developed
the equitable concept of trusts.2' How, then, did these principles,
supposedly based on Roman law, come to be applied to a beach in rural
Alcona County, Michigan?
A. THE RECEPTION OF ROMAN LAW INTO THE COMMON LAW
Abundant traces of Roman law survive today in modern Western
legal culture, even in common law countries.2 The main source of
modern knowledge of later Roman law is the Corpus Juris Civilis,
commissioned by the Eastern Roman Emperor Justinian in the sixth
century A.D. as a summary of the then extant Roman law. 3 After the fall
of the western Roman Empire, Roman law fell into desuetude until the
"Roman law" to justify its expansion of the zone of public trust on New Jersey beaches. See also
Fabrikant v. Currituck County, 621 S.E.2d I9, 27-28 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005) (discussing public trust
doctrine but denying relief to plaintiff seaside landowners who sought to quiet title in themselves to
dry sand portion of beach).
I6. Glass, 703 N.W.2d at 65.
17. Id. Note, however, that the dictionary does not include the qualification that the jus privatum
is "subject to the public trust." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note i, at 879. Black's defines jus
publicum as "[t]he right, title, or dominion of public ownership; esp., the government's right to own
real property in trust for the public benefit," and jus privatum is "[t]he right, title, or dominion of
private ownership." Id. at 878-79.
18. H.F. JoLowlcz, ROMAN FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN LAW 51-53 (1957).
I9. David Johnston, The General Influence of Roman Institutions of State and Public Law, in THE
CIVILIAN TRADITION AND SCOTS LAW, ABERDEEN QUINCENTENERY ESSAYS 88-89 (D.L. Carey Miler &
Reinhard Zimmerman eds., 1997). The definition is Ulpian's, and indicates that public law comprises
three elements: religion, priesthood, and magistracies. Id.
20. Id. at 89 n.7.
21. W.W. BUCKLAND & ARNOLD D. MCNAIR, ROMAN LAW AND COMMON LAW 176 (F.H. Lawson
ed., 2d ed. 1965); THOMAS ScRuTrrON, THE INFLUENCE OF THE ROMAN LAW ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 156
(1885).
22. First-year American law students learn a host of such Latin phrases as pacta sunt servanda, sic
utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, and res judiciata. The most recent edition of Black's Law Dictionary
contains a sixty-two page appendix of legal maxims in Latin. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note I,
at 1703-65.




rediscovery in Italy of the Corpus Juris Civilis around iooo A.D.24 After
its rediscovery, scholars at the University of Bologna (the "glossators")
began commenting on Corpus Juris Civilis in an effort to understand its
meaning. 5 Later scholars organized its precepts and applied them to
legal problems of the day. 6 By 1400, about fifty universities in Europe,
including Oxford and Cambridge, taught Roman law (not local or
territorial law). 7 Lawyers and scholars mined Roman law as a source of
building blocks for a new European legal culture . In a syncretic process,
Roman law and the canon law (Corpus Juris Canonici) were combined to
form the jus commune, or the common legal culture of Europe from the
Middle Ages to the age of codification at end of the eighteenth century. 9
The widespread influence of Roman law by the sixteenth century stems
from several factors: it arrived as a prestigious source of law before
nation-states could decisively impose their own local laws, European
legal culture occurred primarily in one language (Latin), and Roman law
provided better ways of regulating an advancing society and commerce
than local or customary law did." That this source was in the one
common language shared by scholars throughout Europe aided its
diffusion.' Large numbers of law students traveled to foreign
universities, where they learned Roman and Canon law, not local or
customary law.3" When faced with a difficult or novel question, the
lawyer in the jus commune era would first apply local law, and if that did
not provide him an answer, he would turn to scholarly treaties on Roman
law to find one.33 Roman law was thus "a kind of treasure-house where
everybody could enter and find what he needed to solve a legal
problem.""
Roman law survives in various forms in the modern era, as in the
Roman-Dutch legal system,3" Scotland, and Louisiana. It is the
24. Id. The Corpus Juris Civilis was never in force in England because Justinian, as Emperor of
the East, never ruled in Northern France (Normandy) or Great Britain. Id. at 506-o7.
25. Id. at 5o7-o8.
26. Id. at 514.
27. Id. at 516.
28. Id. at513-14
29. Id. at51o, 514-15.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 5o7-o8.
33. Id. at514.
34. Id. at 514 (citing KAN'rOROWICZ, BRACTONIAN PROBLEMS 126 (1940).
35. This system is employed in The Netherlands, South Africa, Guiana, Sri Lanka. See, e.g.,
Demerara Turf Club, Ltd. v. Wight, [1918] A.C. 605 (P.C. I918) (appeal taken from British Guiana)
(applying Roman-Dutch law); W.M. GLOAO & R. CANDLISH HENDERSON, THE LAW OF SCOTLAND
(Laura J. Dunlop et al. eds., iith ed. 200); THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION IN SCOTLAND (Robin Evans-
Jones, ed., 1995); 2 A.N. YIANNOPOULOS, LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE, Property § II (4 th ed. 2oo6)




foundation of many modern civil law regimes; the Code Napolgon was
based in part on it; and civil lawyers see themselves in a sense as heirs to
the Roman law tradition and spend many hours studying Roman law. 6
Latin is still used today, both symbolically (for example, on inscriptions
on judicial buildings and seals) and to communicate legal concepts.37
Roman law, though not directly followed, still serves as a source of
legitimacy and understanding in modern civil law countries."
Though we are not heirs to the civil law, Roman law has long served
as a legitimizing force in the common law. The example of Bracton shows
that there were English jurists of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries who
had a broad understanding of Roman law.39  De Legibus et
Consuetudinibus Angliae, the influential treatise on the laws and customs
of England attributed to Bracton, relied on Roman law for the
proposition that the sea and seashore were common to all, although this
normative view may have been more wishful thinking on Bracton's part
than a reflection of the state of English law at the time.' Moreover, until
the end of the eighteenth century, some English courts, including the
High Court of Admiralty, followed the jus commune as substantive law.4'
The equity courts, whose early chancellors were clerics, relied on
Romano-canonistic procedural and substantive law.4" Blackstone, too,
relied heavily on civil-law authorities. Though the public trust doctrines
of England and the United States have diverged, they both share a
perceived basis in Roman law, as explained below.43 "Justice Storey
relied on the codified reasoning of Justinian and the Code Napoleon in
[his] seminal contributions to the development of an American law of
waters."'  Roman law continues to provide a purported theoretical
foundation for modern legal doctrine,45 as the decision in Glass
indicates.46
36. Coing, supra note 23, at 515.
37. Heikki E.S. Mattila, Jurilinguistique et Latin Juridique, in JURILINGUISTQUE: ENTRE LANGUES Er
DROIT 71, 79 (Jean-Claude Gdmar & Nicholas Kasirer eds., 2005) ("Malgrd l'abandon du latin en tant
que langue vivante des jurists, on utilise cette langue pour exprimer des concepts et des principes
juridiques avec exactitude." ["In spite of the abandonment of Latin as a living language of the jurists,
we still use this language to express legal concepts and principles with exactitude."]).
38. Coing, supra note 23, at 515.
39. Id. For more information about Bracton, see supra note I and sources cited therein.
40. Deveney, supra note 4, at 36-38.
41. Coing, supra note 23, at 515.
42. Edward D. Re, The Roman Contribution to the Common Law, 29 FORDHAM L. REv. 447,479-
83 (1961).
43. See infra Part I.B.
44. Deveney, supra note 4, at I8-I9.
45. See Barry Nicholas, Rules and Terms-Civil Law and Common Law, 48 TUL. L. REv. 946,946
(1974) (noting that common law lawyers have frequently looked to Roman law in developing contract
law doctrine).
46. Glass, 703 N.W.2d at 64 (quoting J.A.C. THOMAS, THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN, TEXT,
TRANSLATION AND COMMENTARY (1975) (translating J. INST. 2.1.1)).
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B. THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE ENTERS THE COMMON LAW
The typical common-law justification for the public trust doctrine is
an oft-misunderstood passage from Justinian's Institutes. The Glass
Court quotes it as follows: "Now the things which are, by natural law,
common to all are these: the air, running water, the sea, and therefore
the seashores. Thus, no one is barred access to the seashore... ""' The
United States Supreme Court has followed suit: "[The sea and seashore]
are incapable of ordinary and private occupation, cultivation and
improvement; their natural and primary uses are public in their nature."4
A few words of explanation about this famous passage are in order here.
Deveney notes that "the category of 'things common to all' has proved to
be a great problem to scholars of the Roman law."49 Things "common to
all" were not at all "public" in the sense that we use that term."° "The sea
and the seashore were 'common to all' only insofar as they were not yet
appropriated to the use of anyone or allocated by the state."'" Once a
person appropriated common things to his own needs, for example, by
building a villa on the seashore, that act "made [the] area... private, and
gave the holder real ownership... which was presumably heritable and
assignable."5 The sea and the seashore were not governed by private law
(us privatum).53 Since they were the property of the Roman people, they
were:
[C]apable of being granted by the state to the complete exclusion of the
rights of the public in general.... There were no restraints whatever
imposed by law on the power of the sovereign to convey public lands,
including the sea and the seashore.... Exclusive grants of the coastal
area resources were frequently made."
Thus, the rights of the public to the seashore were extinguishable in
Rome, which is contrary to the typical assertion of the inalienability of
the public trust (jus publicum) in American common law.5 Compare the
Glass court's formulation: "The state, as sovereign, cannot relinquish [its]
duty to preserve public rights in the Great Lakes and their natural
resources." 6 Moreover,
[p]ublic rights in certain types of access to the waters and lands
beneath them remain under the protection of the state [of Michigan].
Under the public trust doctrine, the sovereign never had the power to
47. Id.
48. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. i, i1 (1892).
49. Deveney, supra note 4, at 26.
50. Id. at 26-33.
51. Id. at 29 (emphasis added).
52. Id. at 30.
53. Id. at 31.
54. Id. at 31-33 (emphasis added).




eliminate those rights, so any subsequent conveyances of littoral
property remain subject to those public rights."
The change in understanding of the public's right to the sea and
shore occurred at the outset of the arrival of the Roman law doctrine
into the common law.
Bracton introduced "almost verbatim" the Roman law of the sea
into English jurisprudence.~ Under the jus publicum as it developed in
the common law, the Crown could not alienate or destroy the public's
right in navigable waters." The Magna Carta supplies the earliest
autochthonous English source of the public's rights to coastal lands." The
common law continued to develop the laws governing coastal resources
over the centuries; great changes occurred in the period between I6oo
and I8oo. 6' English and American courts generally accepted the idea that
"title to the foreshore and lands under water was prima facie in the
Crown and had not been conveyed when littoral lands were conveyed." 62
Lord Chief Justice Hale "defined the jus publicum-the right of the
public in navigable waters-and declared it beyond the power of the
crown to abrogate." 63 Hale's 1667 treatise, De Jure Maris et Brachiorum
Ejusdem,64 has had a profound influence on American law.6 5 In it, Hale
lays out "the vocabulary and conceptual set for future discussion of the
law of the coastal area."6 The jus privatum he defined as the private title
to coastal land. 67 The jus regium or the royal right, was akin to the police
power and as such could not be conveyed to a subject.68 The king's role
was "vindex et defensor jurium publicorum. "' The jus publicum for Hale
was "solely an interest in navigation and a public right to have navigable
rivers and the ports of the kingdom free of nuisances."7 Deveney notes
that "[t]here is no suggestion whatsoever of a public trust in Lord Hale's
57. Id. at 66.
58. Deveney, supra note 4, at I7.
59. Id. at 36. This survives in the United States as the federal navigational servitude, which
"preserves for the federal government control of all navigable waters 'for the purpose of regulating
and improving navigation....' Glass, 703 N.W.2d at 64-65 (quoting Gibson v. United States, 166
U.S. 269, 271-72 (1897)).
6o. Deveney, supra note 4, at 39-41. Deveney notes wryly that "American courts have obtained
extraordinary mileage from the prohibitions of Magna Carta." Id. at 40-4
i
.
6i. Id. at 41.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. LORD CHIEF JUSTICE HALE, DE JURE MARLS ET BRACHIORUM EJUSDEM (1667), reprinted in
STUART A. MOORE, A HISTORY OF THE FORESHORE AND THE LAW RELATING THERETO 370-413 (1888).
65. Deveney, supra note 4, at 44-45.
66. Id. at 45.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. I.e., the vindicator and defender of public rights. SIR MATrHEW HALE, FIRST TREATISE (1768),
reprinted in MOORE, supra note 64, at 55 .
7
o
. Deveney, supra note 4, at 44-45.
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writings, and he recognized no limitations on the power of the Crown to
convey title to the coastal area."7' After the Restoration, English kings
continued to make extensive grants of Crown lands under water.72
Hale's definition of the jus publicum was transformed when it
entered American jurisprudence and became "a species of quasi-
property which the state must maintain to preserve navigation," rather
than what it had been in England, "an open-ended set of uses over
navigable waters protected by the police power of the state."73 In 1842,
Martin v. Waddell's Lessee74 further confused Hale's categories by
seeming to indicate that the jus publicum might be "passed" by the
sovereign to a private landowner.75 It was not until fifty years later, in
Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois, that the Court clarified that what a
state could not transfer is its sovereignty: "[Tihe power exercised by the
State over the lands and waters is... the jus regium, the right of
regulating, improving and securing them for the benefit of every
individual citizen. ' '76 Both the majority and the dissent in Glass cited
Illinois Central as defining "the scope of the public trust doctrine as
applied to the submerged lands of the Great Lakes."77 Parts II and III,
below, discuss the effect Michigan's application of the public trust
doctrine has had on private property rights.
II. THE GLASS DECISION
A. KEEP OFF My BEACH, LADY
In Glass, the Michigan Supreme Court applied the public trust
doctrine to a dispute between neighbors,78 and in so doing, arguably
changed Michigan property law regarding the rights of littoral
landowners. In 1997, Richard and Kathleen Goeckel bought land on the
shore of Lake Huron. 9 Joan Glass, a widow, has owned a cottage across
the highway from the Goeckels since 1967 .8° The previous owner of the
Goeckels' property deeded Glass a fifteen-foot-wide easement across the
71. Id. at 48.
72. See MOORE, supra note 64, at 414-26.
73. Deveney, supra note 4, at 53-54.
74. Martin v. Lessee of Waddell, 41 U.S. 367 (1842).
75. Deveney, supra note 4, at 56-59.
76. 146 U.S. 387, 456 (I892).
77. Glass v. Goeckel, 703 N.W.2d 58, 87-88 (Mich. 2005) (Markman, J., dissenting); see also id. at
61 (majority opinion). The dissent emphasized that "[blecause the state's public-trust title is a function
of its sovereignty, the lands covered by the doctrine cannot be alienated, except when such alienation
promotes the public use of them and the public use of the lands and waters remaining is not harmed."
Id. at 88 (Markman, J., dissenting).
78. Id. at 61-62.




Goeckels' property "for ingress and egress to Lake Huron."8' Like many
visitors to the Great Lakes, Glass and the Goeckels had walked along the
shore in front of their neighbors' private beachfront property. ' In
August 2000, the Goeckels disputed Glass's use of the easement.8' Glass
filed suit in May 2001 to enjoin the Goeckels from interfering with her
use of it.84 The parties resolved the easement issue among themselves in
July 2001, and Glass was able to use the easement to pass to and from the
lake and to enjoy the beach portion of the easement for "sunbathing and
lounging."8
One issue remained, however: whether Glass had a right to walk
along the beach in front of the Goeckels' property, outside the bounds of
her fifteen-foot-wide easement.86 On May 13, 2004, the trial court granted
summary disposition in favor of Glass.8' Relying on section 2 of the Great
Lakes Submerged Lands Act," the court found that she had the right to
"use the shore of Lake Huron lying below and lakewards of the natural
ordinary high water mark for pedestrian travel.'"8
The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the trial court on May 13,
2004 .' It found the Submerged Lands Act inapplicable and held
unanimously that Glass could not "interfere" with the Goeckels' right to
exclude others from their land.9' The appellate court reasoned that under
the public trust doctrine, the public could use the waters and submerged
lands of the Great Lakes up to the water's edge, and the littoral92
property owner's right of exclusive use extended down to the water's
edge.93 Consequently, it ruled that Glass had no right to walk along the
beach between the "ordinary high-water mark" and the water's edge.94
Thus, according to the court of appeals, visitors to the Great Lakes in
Michigan could avoid trespassing on private beaches only by walking
81. Id.





87. Id. at 31-32.
88. MICH. CoMp. LAWS §§ 324.32501-.32516 (West I999 & Supp. 2006).
89. Glass v. Goeckel, 683 N.W.2d 719, 721 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004).
90. Id. at 719, 729.
91. Id. at 729.
92. As for the meaning of the term "littoral," the Michigan Supreme Court noted:
Modern usage distinguishes between "littoral" and "riparian," with the former applying to
seas and their coasts and the latter applying to rivers and streams. Our case law has not
always precisely distinguished between the two terms. Consistent with our recognition that
the common law of the sea applies to our Great Lakes, we will describe defendants'
property as littoral property.
Glass, 703 N.W.2d at 6i n.i (internal citations omitted).
93. Glass, 683 N.W.2d at 725-27.
94. Id. at 720-21.
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with their feet in the water. Approximately 70% of the 3288 miles of
Michigan's shoreline is privately owned.95
Glass appealed to the Michigan Supreme Court, which decided in
her favor on June 29, 2005.6 The majority agreed with the lower court
that members of the public, like Glass, have a right to walk on privately
owned Great Lakes beaches within the area of public trust. 7 The court
divided, however, over the location of the landward edge of the area of
public trust and the right of the public to walk in that area." Under the
majority's view, the zone of the public trust doctrine in Michigan has
always extended from the water up to "the ordinary high water mark,"
and the state, as sovereign protects the public's right to walk in that
area." Because no Michigan statute, including the Great Lakes
Submerged Lands Act, addresses the issue, the court turned to the
common law."° The majority held that the Goeckels' property was
conveyed to them "subject to specific public trust rights in Lake Huron
and its shores up to the ordinary high water mark ....' In the dissent's view,
on the other hand, the line between wet and dry sand defined the
boundary down to which littoral landowners could exclude members of
the public.' °2 Furthermore, the dissent did not believe that public trust
doctrine in Michigan protected the public's right to walk along otherwise
private Great Lakes beaches.' 3 The dissenters also disputed the
majority's application of the jus privatum and the jus publicum. 04
On September 14, 2005, the Michigan Supreme Court denied the
Goeckels' motion for a rehearing." A minor point in the Goeckels'
petition was the claim that the court's decision had constituted a taking
by transforming private property into public property without
compensation."
On December 12, 2005, the Goeckels petitioned the United States
Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari."'7 The Court denied the petition
two months later."'° In so doing, the Court has allowed the State of
Michigan, through its judiciary, to effect, unconstitutionally, a permanent
95- Eggert, supra note 2.
96. Glass, 703 N.W.2d at 62.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 61.
99. Id. at 62, 73.
ioo. Id. at 61-62.
tot. Id. at 62.
102. Id. at 8o & n.6 (Young, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
103. ld. at 83 (Markman, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
Io4. Id. at i03-o6.
1o5. Glass v. Goeckel, 703 N.W.2d 188 (Mich. 2005).
io6. Defendants'/Appellees' Motion for Rehearing at 3, 20-23, Glass, 703 N.W.2d 58 (No. I264o9).
107. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Goeckel v. Glass, 126 S. Cr. 1340 (2004) (No. 05-764).
io8. Glass, 126 S. Ct. 1340.
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and uncompensated taking of private property for public use.
The Supreme Court did not list its reasons for denying certiorari, as
usual, but several possibilities present themselves. First, the Court may
have simply agreed with Glass that the Goeckels had failed to properly
raise their Fifth Amendment takings challenge in the Michigan state
court proceedings.'" The Goeckels countered this argument by filing a
supplemental brief in reply to respond to the supposed lack of federal
question."I The Goeckels argued that they could not have raised a
takings claim at the appellate level, as the issue was not before the court
and did not arise until the Court of Appeals issued its decision."' They
also argued that they had, in fact, raised a potential takings claim in their
brief to the Michigan Supreme Court and in their petition for
rehearing."2 Moreover, the Goeckels noted that the Court had found
federal jurisdiction in other cases where takings claims had not been
raised in the state courts below."3 If the Court's denial of certiorari
turned on the failure to raise federal claims in the Michigan courts, the
Goeckels' reply brief may have come too late. The Court denied
certiorari four business days after the reply brief was filed."4
B. THE NOVEL DEFINITION OF THE BOUNDARY OF THE PUBLIC TRUST IN
GLASS IS CONTRARY TO MICHIGAN PRECEDENT AND THE REASONABLE
EXPECTATIONS OF PROPERTY OWNERS
The lakeside boundary of the Goeckels' property is described in
their deed as the "meander line."'"5 In Michigan, the meander line has
played a repeated role in disputes over property rights at the water's
edge.",6 When surveyors laid out the United States rectangular survey in
the nineteenth century, they used the meander line to denote the
approximate boundary between land and water."7 The meander line was
used merely to calculate acreage when the government sold the surveyed
plots; in contrast, the boundary of private title was defined as the water's
to9. See Respondents' Brief in Opposition at 23-26, Glass, 126 S. Ct. 1340 (No. 05-764).
Iio. Petitioners' Brief in Reply at 3-5, Glass, 126 S. Ct. 1340 (No. 05-764).
iii. Id. at 8.
112. Id. at 3-5.
113. Id. at 6-7; see, e.g., First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los
Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 313-14 n.8 (1987); PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 85-86 n.9
(i98o) ("[Flederal claims.., have been adequately presented even though not raised in lower state
courts when the highest state court renders an unexpected interpretation of state law or reverses its
prior interpretation.").
I14. The reply brief was filed on February 15, 2006. Petitioners' Brief in Reply, supra note iso, at
3-5. Certiorari was denied on February 21, 2006. Glass, 126 S. Ct. 1340 (2006).
115. Glass v. Goeckel, 703 N.W.2d 58, 62-63 (Mich. 2005).
t16. See Theodore Steinberg, God's Terminus: Boundaries, Natures, and Property on the Michigan




edge."8 The United States rectangular survey reached Michigan in 1815,
but by the 192os, after a century of reliction and accretion along Lake
Huron, the meander line could be hundreds of feet inland from the
water's edge." 9 This gap between the meander line and the water's edge
would give rise in the 1920S to a period of muddied property law in
Michigan.
Michigan early on recognized that the water's edge marked the limit
of state, or public, ownership of littoral lands. With regard to the parts of
the Great Lakes that lie within Michigan, "the proprietor of the adjacent
shore has no property whatever in the land covered by the water," which
implies that whatever title the state holds, it ends at the water's edge. 20
Subsequent rulings also recognized the water's edge as the limit of state
title.
[I]t must be taken as settled state law that all land submerged, when
the water in the lakes stands at low-water mark, is a part of the lake,
and the title in the State, and all land between low-water mark and the
meander line belongs to the abutting proprietor. .... "'
The Supreme Court noted that littoral fee ownership in Michigan is
burdened by the federal navigation servitude."' And under the public
trust doctrine, the state reserves certain rights over private littoral land
so that members of the public may hunt, fish, swim, and boat in the
waters along the shores of the Great Lakes.2 3
Except for a tumultuous time in the 1920s, the water's edge served as
the littoral property line in Michigan.' 4 The tumult in the 1920S was
caused by the Michigan Supreme Court's decisions in the Kavanaugh
cases, which overturned eighty years of case law by holding thatthe title
of littoral landowners extended only to the meander line, not the water's
edge, as had previously been thought.'25 The court even conceded that its
rulings were "against the overwhelming weight of authority."'I2 6 The
Kavanaugh cases involved a dispute about whether title to relicted or
accreted land in Saginaw Bay vested in the adjacent landowner or in the
118. Id. at 72, 80; see also Hilt v. Weber, 233 N.W. 159, 161 (Mich. 1930).
ii9. Steinberg, supra note ii6, at 69.
i2o. Glass, 703 N.W.2d at 8o-81 (quoting La Plaisance Bay Harbor Co. v. Council of City of
Monroe, Walker's Ch. Rep. i55, 168 (Mich. 1843)).
21. State v. Lake St. Clair Fishing & Shooting Club, 87 N.W. 117, 122 (Mich. 19oi) (Hooker, J.,
concurring) (emphasis added); see also Staub v. Tripp, 235 N.W. 844, 844 (Mich. 1931) ("[Private] title
extended beyond the meander line to the water's edge.").
122. Glass, 7o3 N.W.2d at 64 n.7; accord Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 435 (1892);
Nedtweg v. Wallace, 208 N.W. 51, 52 (Mich. 1926).
123. Glass, 703 N.W.2d at 64-65.
124. Steinberg, supra note 16, at 72, 80.
125. Glass, 703 N.W.2d at 84 (Markman, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); see also
Kavanaugh v. Baird, 217 N.W. 2, 6-7 (Mich. 1928), rev'd, 235 N.W. 871, 871 (193I); Kavanaugh v.
Rabior, 192 N.W. 623, 624-25 (Mich. 1923).
126. Baird, 217 N.W. at 7.
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state.'" The Kavanaugh cases converted thousands of acres of dry land
between the meander line and the lakeshore to state property, and it
understandably caused great resentment among littoral landowners and
the nascent real estate and tourism industries. 2
8
In 1930, in Hilt v. Weber, however, the court returned to its earlier
precedents and restored the boundary of private title to the water's edge:
"the title of the riparian owner follows the shore line under what has
been graphically called 'a movable freehold." '2 .9 Hilt also involved a
dispute about the boundary of the state's interests in lakeshore land.3'
Despite the Glass court's mischaracterization of Hilt as involving the
boundary of a littoral landowner's private title, not the public trust, 3' the
Hilt court explicitly held that the boundary of public trust, not private
title, was at issue.3 ' Hilt eliminated the "overhanging threat of the State's
claim of right to occupy [the land between the meander line and the
water's edge] for State purposes."'33 The Hilt court further held that
"[t]he riparian owner has the exclusive use of the bank and shore."'34 In
the leading Michigan case on this issue before Glass, the court reaffirmed
the rule that littoral title extends to the shore: the riparian owner has the
right of "exclusive use of the bank and shore."'35
Just as in Hilt, what was at issue in Glass was not the lakeside
boundary of the Goeckels' private title, but the boundary of the public
trust zone."6 The majority turned to Wisconsin law for the definition of
the ordinary high-water mark because it believed that Michigan law
lacked a precise definition.'37 In the imported definition, the ordinary
high-water mark is "'the point on the ... shore up to which the presence
and actibn of the water is so continuous as to leave a distinct mark either
by erosion [or] destruction of terrestrial vegetation.. ' ' ... In formulating
this fresh definition, the majority rejected seventy years of precedent that
had developed since Hilt.
The dissenters rejected the Wisconsin definition as novel, vague, and
127. See Glass, 703 N.W.2d at 84.
128. See Steinberg, supra note 116, at 77-82.
129. Hilt v. Weber, 233 N.W. 159, I66 (Mich. 1930) (quoting 28 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND
361).
130. See id. at 167.
131. See Glass, 703 N.W.2d. at 70-71.
132. Hilt, 233 N.W. at 16o.
133. Id. at 168; accord Defendant's/Appellee's Motion for Rehearing at 5-6, Glass, 703 N.W.2d 58
(Mich. 2005) (No. 126409).
134. Hilt, 233 N.W. at 168 (emphasis added).
135. Peterman v. State Dep't of Natural Res., 521 N.W.2d 499, 507 (Mich. 1994).
136. See Glass, 703 N.W.2d at 63 n.5.
137. Id. at 62 n.4.
138. Id. at 72 (quoting Diana Shooting Club v. Husting, 145 N.W. 816, 820 (Wis. 1914) (defining
Wisconsin's public trust doctrine as applied to an inland river)).
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unwieldy.'39 After examining traditional Michigan law, they concluded
that the water's edge and the area of sand dampened by the water
formed the boundary of the public trust.40 For the dissenters, the
Goeckels' zone of exclusive use extended from the uplands down to the
submerged lands-that is, down to land covered by water and the wet
sand next to the water's edge.'4 ' The two dissenters conceded that the
public had the right to walk on some portion of the beach; they disagreed
with the majority, however, on the how far up the beach away from the
water that area extended.'42
In addition to the common law, the majority turned to the Roman
law principles of jus privatum and the jus publicum to justify its ruling.'43
The dissenters also challenged the majority's interpretation of Roman
law.'" The entire court agreed that title to submerged lands under
navigable waters is divided between the overlapping jus privatum and the
jus publicum, the former protecting the rights of the private owner, but
subject always to the latter's protection of public navigation rights.'45
Contrary to the majority's application of the jus publicum to
unsubmerged lands, the principal dissent argued that under Michigan
precedent, the jus publicum has in fact always been limited to submerged
lands and the water flowing over them.16 The dissent observed,
moreover, that the jus publicum protects the public's rights to only
certain uses of private property: navigation, fishing, and hunting, not
beach-walking. 47
When it adopted Wisconsin's use of the "ordinary high-water mark"
as the boundary of the public trust zone, the Michigan Supreme Court
ignored its own precedent and radically changed the Michigan law
governing the rights of the state's littoral landowners and upset the
expectations of Michigan beachfront property owners. In 1978, in
response to queries from a state senator, the Michigan Attorney General
issued an official opinion stating that:
The owner of riparian property on the shore of one of the Great Lakes
139. See id. at 8i-82 (Markman, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
140. Id. at 83-85.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 79-8o (Young, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); see also id. at 9o-9i (Markman,
J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
143. Id. at 63-67.
144. Id. at 103-05.
145. Id. at io3.
146. Glass, 703 N.W.2d at 83; see also Nedtweg v. Wallace, 2o8 N.W. 51, 53 (Mich. 1926) (stating
that the State of Michigan retains both the jus privatum and the jus publicum in the submerged lands
of the Great Lakes); McMorran Milling Co. v. C.H. Little Co., 167 N.W. 990, 993 (Mich. 1918)
(holding that private riparian title (us privatum) is always subject to the jus publicum); Lorman v.
Benson, 8 Mich. 18, 30 (186o) (explaining the use of jus publicum and jus privatum with regard to
ownership of a riverbed).
147. See Glass, 703 N.W.2d at 87, 104-05 (Markman, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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has the right of exclusive use of the bank and shore[,] although title is
in the State. Thus, the riparian owner may prevent persons from using
the beach of his riparian land regardless of whether that land is above
or below the ordinary high water mark."'' 4
The Opinion even suggests that beachfront landowners have the
right to bring trespass actions against interlopers. 49 About twenty years
later, Michigan's Department of Natural Resources advised the state's
citizens that along the shores of the Great Lakes,
[tihe boundary line is the ordinary high water mark. The riparian
owner controls the exposed soil between the ordinary high water mark
and the water's edge and may, therefore, prevent the public from
trespassing on this exposed soil if he so chooses. The public does,
however, have a ght of passage in any area adjacent to riparian land
covered by water.
Given the weight of precedent and official pronouncements like
these, the Goeckels and other owners of land along Lake Huron could
have reasonably expected that one of the sticks in their private property
bundle included the right to exclude and expel anyone walking across
their beach, just as they have the right to exclude anyone from walking
across their land along its roadside boundary. In abolishing the Goeckels'
right to exclude trespassers, the Michigan Supreme Court has put private
land to public use.
III. GLASS IMPLICATES THE TAKINGS CLAUSE OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
"The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, made applicable to
the States through the Fourteenth, provides that private property shall
not 'be taken for public use, without just compensation.""'. The Takings
Clause "is designed not to limit the governmental interference with
property rights per se, but rather to secure compensation in the event of
otherwise proper interference amounting to a taking.'. 5 The clause bars
the government from "forcing some people alone to bear public burdens
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a
whole."'53
Glass presents a takings question because (I) private property was
(2) taken (3) for public use (4) without payment of just compensation.
Because Glass involves the public's right to walk along the shore of Lake
148. Op. Mich. Att'y Gen. 5327 (July 6, 1978) (emphasis added), available at
http://www.ag.state.mi.us/opinion/datafiles/197os/op05327.htm.
149. See id.
I5o. LAW ENFORCEMENT DIVISION, MICH. DEP'T OF NATURAL RES., PUBLIC RIGHTS ON MICHIGAN
WATERS 35 (1997), available at http://michigan.gov/documents/Water97eI42928-7.pdf.
151. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 536 (2005) (internal citation omitted).
152. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S.
304, 315 (1987).
153. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40,49 (196o).
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Huron, the court's ruling unquestionably implicates the "public use"
aspect of a taking. And since the Glass court saw no need to offer
payment to the affected landowners, the compensation element of a
takings claim is satisfied. The dispute lies in whether the sudden and
unexpected change in Michigan law in Glass works to take private
property. As explained below, Glass effectively takes one of the
Goeckels' private property rights-the right to exclude-and gives it to
the State of Michigan for the benefit of the public. This authorization of
a permanent, uncompensated, physical occupation of private property
for public use thus constitutes a taking of the Goeckels' property under
the Fifth Amendment. Michigan has engaged in a landgrab.
The result in Glass constitutes a taking in two ways. First, "where
government requires an owner to suffer permanent physical invasion of
her property-however minor-it must provide just compensation. '
The Michigan Supreme Court in essence has demanded that littoral
landowners grant an easement for public access. Had the Michigan
government "simply appropriated the easement in question, this would
have been a per se physical taking [requiring compensation]."'55 Second,
the decision in Glass also satisfies the multi-factor takings test the United
States Supreme Court set forth in Penn Central Transportation Co. v.
City of New York.' 56 Among those factors are the character of the
government action, its economic impact on the property owner, and the
historical context. 
57
"[T]he individual states have the authority to define the limits of the
lands held in public trust and to recognize private rights in such lands as
they see fit."' 5 In Michigan, "state law became paramount on the title [to
lakefront property] after it vested in a private person."'59 A state's power
to define its property law is not, of course, without limits. The Supreme
Court has held that "a [s]tate, by ipse dixit, may not transform private
property into public property without compensation. '" ' 6 The Court will
review a state's changes to its property law to ensure that constitutional
protections are not violated. "To the extent that the decision" of a state
supreme court on a property law issue "arguably conforms to reasonable
expectations, we must of course accept it as conclusive. But to the extent
that it constitutes a sudden change in state law, unpredictable in terms of
154. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538; accord Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S.
419, 441 (1982)-
155. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 546.
I56. 438 U.S. 104, 124-25 (1978).
157. See id. at 124.
158. Phillips Petroleum Co. v Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469,476 (1988).
159. Hilt v. Weber, 233 N.W. i59, 161-62 (Mich. 1930).
i6o. Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. I55, 164 (1980).
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Whether such a decision "worked an unpredictable change in state law
thus inevitably presents a federal question for the determination" of the
United States Supreme Court. 6' The fact that the Michigan Supreme
Court did not give much consideration to the constitutionality of its
decision in Glass is no bar to the Supreme Court's consideration of the
takings issue here. Because the Michigan Supreme Court has made an
unreasonable, sudden, and unpredictable change in Michigan property
law, the Supreme Court should not have granted the Michigan decision
any deference in considering whether an uncompensated taking had
occurred.
A. A JUDICIAL DECISION CAN EFFECT A TAKING
In Hughes v. Washington, Justice Stewart argued that a state "cannot
be permitted to defeat the constitutional prohibition against taking
property without due process of law by the simple device of asserting
retroactively that the property it has taken never existed at all. 'I63 Justice
Scalia has argued more recently in Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach that
"[n]o more by judicial decree than by legislative fiat may a State
transform private property into public property without
compensation."64
The question common to Glass, Hughes, and Stevens is whether a
decision of a state supreme court can amount to a taking if the decision
changes the state's property law precedents and divests waterside
landowners of their property. The Michigan Supreme Court, in Glass,
blithely asserted that its decision did not amount to a taking.' 65 The
Goeckels "have not lost any property rights" under the theory of the
majority, because "no taking occurs when the state protects and retains
that which it could not alienate: public rights held pursuant to the public
trust doctrine."' 66 However, as explained above, by ignoring its own
precedent and shifting the boundary of the area of public trust from the
water's edge to the ordinary high-water mark, the Goeckels did, in fact,
161. Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 296 (1967) (Stewart, J., concurring) (holding that the
right to ocean-side accretions is governed by federal law).
162. Id. at 297.
163. Id. at 296-97.
164. Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 510 U.S. 1207, 1207 (994) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (dissenting
from the Court's denial of a petition for certiorari to the Oregon Supreme Court for a takings claim
brought by beachfront property owners who were not allowed to build a seawall). Glass is
distinguishable from both Hughes and Stevens because the rights the Michigan Supreme Court
recognized are within the common law public trust doctrine. See Glass, 703 N.W.2d at 673-74. In
contrast, Hughes concerned title to land relicted by the Pacific Ocean, see Hughes, 389 U.S. at 29o-9i,
and Stevens concerned Oregon's application of the English doctrine of custom to prohibit construction
on a beach, see Stevens, 55o U.S. at 1207-09.




lose their right to exclude members of the public from what had been the
private portion of their beach. The court's decision thus divested them of
some of their property-the right to exclude-without affording them
just compensation.
Some commentators have agreed with the position taken by Justice
Scalia in Stevens and have argued that the Fifth Amendment's
prohibition on takings ought to be applied to judicial decisions, as well as
to legislative and administrative actions.' The Court has not historically
been willing to review state court decisions as takings, perhaps for
prudential reasons and principles of federalism.68 To be sure, the Court
has not been hesitant to tackle takings claims that result from state
legislation affecting property rights;'6 however, the Court may have
denied the Goeckels' petition for writ of certiorari in part to avoid having
to evaluate whether a judicial decision had effected a taking.
As Professor Thompson has noted, the doctrine of judicial takings
has been opposed because it would encroach on a domain traditionally
reserved to the states: "By extending the takings protections to the
courts, federal courts would be controlling the rate and nature of change
in state property law-and thus to an extent federalizing that law."' 70
Nonetheless, a judicial decision like this, which turns private property
into public property, effects a taking just as much as a legislative action
would. Since the Supreme Court reviews the decisions of state courts
when they have the effect of denying constitutional protections to
citizens, the Court should have applied the same scrutiny to the
deleterious effects of the judicial taking in Glass.
B. GLASS IS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL PER SE TAKING BECAUSE IT GRANTS A
PERMANENT, UNCOMPENSATED, NONCONSENSUAL EASEMENT OF PUBLIC
ACCESS ACROSS PRIVATELY OWNED LITTORAL LAND
"The Court has held that physical takings require compensation
because of the unique burden they impose: A permanent physical
invasion, however minimal the economic cost it entails, eviscerates the
owner's right to exclude others from entering and using her property-
perhaps the most fundamental of all property interests.'' I In Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., a New York state law required
167. W. David Sarratt, Note, Judicial Takings and the Course Pursued, 90 VA. L. REV. 1487, 1531
(2004). See generally Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Judicial Takings, 76 VA. L. REV. 1449 (1990).
168. Sarratt, supra note 167, at 1493-94, 1501-10.
169. See, e.g., Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 26o U.S. 393, 412-13 (1922). The Court has also been willing
to tackle administrative action that takes property rights. See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S.
374,377-80 (994); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825,828-30 (1987).
17o. Thompson, supra note 167, at 1509.
171. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005); accord Loretto v. Teleprompter




landlords to permit cable television companies to install cables and
fixtures on their apartment buildings.'72 The landlords were not allowed
to interfere with the installation of the cable fixtures or to demand
payment beyond the one-time one-dollar payment authorized by the
State Commission on Cable Television.'73 The cable equipment on
Loretto's building took up very little space, but the Court held that any
government-ordered "permanent physical occupation" was a per se
taking, even though the law served a public purpose.'74
The Loretto Court rested its decision on two particular
considerations: the physical occupation (i) was without the property
owner's consent and (2) was a "permanent occupation." '' First, the
Court dismissed the suggestion that Loretto had consented to the cable
installation (and the occupation of her property) because she had bought
the building when the cables were already installed and because she
chose to remain a residential landlord.' 76 The ability to engage in a
business cannot be conditioned on forfeiting a right to compensation for
a physical occupation.'77 Second, the Court reasoned that a permanent
physical occupation denies the owner any power to control use of the
property herself, denies her any power to exclude others from that area,
and may impair her ability to sell the property.'78 The owner suffers a
special kind of injury when the occupier of her property is a stranger, and
the injury is made worse because it is not a temporary physical invasion,
like that in PruneYard.'79 The Loretto Court also held that the
protections of the Fifth Amendment do not depend on the size of the
area permanently occupied.""°
As the United States Supreme Court noted in Nollan v. California
Coastal Commission, if the government simply requires landowners to
"make an easement across their beachfront available to the public on a
permanent basis in order to increase public access to the beach," this
would be without doubt a taking.' When such an easement gives the
public "a permanent and continuous right to pass to and fro," a
"permanent physical occupation" has occurred.l The easements for
172. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 421.
173. Id. at 423-24.
174- Id. at 426.
175. Id. at 426-436.
176. Id. at 421-22, 439 n.17.
177. Id. at 439 n.17.
178. See id. at 435-36.
179. Id. at 436; see PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 82-83 (980) (denying a
takings claim where a state constitution required shopping center owner to permit individuals to
exercise periodically their free speech rights in the shopping center).
18o. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 436-37.
i81. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 831 (1987); accord Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512
U.S. 374,384 (I994).
182. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 832.
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public access in both Nollan and Dolan arose in the context of land-use
regulations; a government agency required the easements as a condition
of granting development permits. 13
Glass meets the requirements of a per se taking under Loretto. The
Goeckels do not consent, of course, to opening the beach in front of their
home up to the nebulously defined ordinary high-water mark so that any
and all strangers may pass by. Unlike the PruneYard Court, the Michigan
Supreme Court does not seem to have contemplated allowing the
Goeckels to impose reasonable limitations on the ability of strangers to
walk across their land.' 4 The only way the Goeckels could evade this
burden is to sell their property, but like Ms. Loretto, the next owners
would also be burdened with the same servitude, whether they consented
to it or not. The Glass decision does not allow strangers to install
something on the Goeckels' property, as in Loretto, but it prevents the
Goeckels from excluding strangers from part of their once-private beach.
Though the issue of exactions is not present in Glass, the easements in
Nollan and Dolan and the Glass decision result in the same effect:
beachfront landowners are required by the state to dedicate, without
compensation, a portion of their property for public use.'lS
The Court in Glass requires the Goeckels to grant a permanent
easement for public access across their beach without compensation, and
without even a nominal quid pro quo like that offered in Nollan and
Dolan. The Goeckels have thus suffered a taking, and Michigan ought to
have been required to compensate them for it.
C. GLASS IS ALSO AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL TAKING UNDER THE MULTI-
FACTOR PENN CENTRAL ANALYSIS
In addition to meeting the per se takings test under Loretto, Glass
also meets the multi-factor takings test of Penn Central Transportation
Co. v. City of New York.I 81 In Penn Central the Court denied Penn
Central Transportation Company's takings challenge to a New York City
landmarks preservation law that had been used to prevent the railroad
from redeveloping its property at Grand Central Terminal.8' The
railroad had planned either to raze Grand Central Terminal and build a
fifty-five-story skyscraper in its stead, or to graft the skyscraper atop the
shell of the station.'8 The Court noted that "government actions that
183. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 379-80; Nollan, 483 U.S. at 828.
184. See PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 83.
185. Because Glass does not involve exactions, the "essential nexus" and "rough proportionality"
requirements of Nollan and Dolan do not apply here. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 388-91; Nollan, 483 U.S.
at 837.
i86. 438 U.S. 104, 24-25 (1978).
187. Id. at 117, 138.
188. Id. at 116-17.
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may be characterized as acquisitions of resources to permit or facilitate
uniquely public functions have often been held to constitute 'takings.""
89
In evaluating this type of takings claim, the Court identified several
factors of "particular significance."'" Most relevant here are (i) the
character of the government action;, and (2) the related factors of (a) its
economic impact on the property owner, (b) the degree to which the
action interferes with "investment-backed expectations," and (c)
diminution in value resulting from the action.'9 The historical context of
the Penn Central decision is a further factor, though it is present mostly
as subtext.
i. Character of the Government Action in Glass
"A 'taking' may more readily be found when the interference with
property can be characterized as a physical invasion by the government"
than when the interference is in the nature of a nuisance regulation.'92
The Supreme Court denied Penn Central's taking claim in part because
the landmarks law at issue there did not invade the railroad's property or
conscript it for government use, but was rather a restriction on its use,
akin to a zoning regulation.93 The Court reasoned, "This is no more an
appropriation of property by government for its own uses than is a
zoning law.., or a safety regulation."'' The Court distinguished the
landmarks law from the taking in United States v. Causby, which involved
a government invasion and appropriation of airspace.'9 In Causby, low-
flying military aircraft destroyed the use of the farm beneath; the Court
held that the government had not "merely destroyed property [but was]
using a part of it.' 96 In contrast, the city's refusal in Penn Central to allow
a skyscraper did not destroy the use or value of Grand Central Terminal
because, even with the restriction in place, it remained a busy train
station.' 7 The Court also rejected the railroad's contention that its air
rights should be severed from the parcel as a whole when the Court
analyzed whether the city had taken one of the railroad's property
interests.' 9' In evaluating whether a government action constitutes a
taking, the Court "focuses ... both on the character of the action and the
nature and extent of the interference with rights as a whole."' 9
In contrast to Penn Central, Glass offers a textbook example of "an
189. Id. at 128.
190. Id. at 124.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 135.
194. Id.
195. Id.; see United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
196. Causby, 328 U.S. at 262-63 & n.7.
197. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 135-36.
198. Id. at 130.
199. Id. at 130-31.
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appropriation of property by government for its own uses."'" As
explained above, when the Michigan Supreme Court moved the
boundary of the zone of public trust from the water's edge to the
ordinary high-water mark and allowed the public to walk on what had
been private land, it conscripted the Goeckels' property for public use.
This is not a mere restriction on the Goeckels' development rights as in
Penn Central or a public health regulation as in Hadacheck v.
Sebastian,"0 ' but a government-authorized invasion of their property, as
in Causby. Michigan has appropriated both the Goeckels' right to
exclude and their right to privacy, and it has thereby diminished the
value of their parcel as a whole.
2. Economic Impact on the Goeckels and Diminution in Value
In addition to the character of the government action, Penn Central
identified economic factors to be used when evaluating a takings claim,
i.e., "[tihe economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and,
particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with
distinct investment-backed expectations .... . The Penn Central Court
found that despite the landmarks law, the railroad could still earn a
reasonable return on its investment, especially in light of the fact that the
railroad owned numerous properties in the neighborhood that benefited
from the presence of the station.2" The Court also rejected the
proposition that "diminution in property value, standing alone, [could]
establish a 'taking.""'2 4 Diminution in value nonetheless has remained an
important factor in the Court's evaluation of takings claims." The Court
in Penn Central found that the economic impact of the landmarks law on
the railroad was not sufficient to establish a takings claim, especially in
light of mitigating factor of the transferable development rights.2, The
law did not prohibit all development above Grand Central Terminal, and
the railroad could transfer or sell its unused air space development rights
to other parcels.7
Because Glass was decided on the basis of a motion for summary
dismissal, a full range of evidence on the economic effects of the decision
are not present. However, the Michigan Supreme Court's decision to
200. Id. at 135.
201. 239 U.S. 394,46 (915).
202. Id. at 124.
203. Id. at 129.
204. Id. at I31; accord Hadacheck, 239 U.S. at 401, 44 (holding that a 87.5% diminution in value
did not constitute a taking).
205. See, e.g., Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 540 (2005); Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council,
Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'I Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 330 (2002); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374,
384-85 (I994); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, IOI9 n.18 (1992); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal
Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825,855 (1987).




turn a private beach into a semi-public one will no doubt substantially
diminish the fair market value of the Goeckels' property. Though the
Goeckels do not hold the land as an investment, its purchase price would
have reflected the fact that they were buying 135 feet of private beach
along Lake Huron.2°8 The premium they paid for privacy has been taken
from them by Glass. Moreover, unlike Penn Central, there are no
mitigating development rights the Goeckels can use to offset the
diminution in value caused by the government action.
3. Historical Context
Although the Court in Penn Central does not explicitly refer to the
recent history of the railroad in its decision, the backdrop to the action
was the 1963 destruction of the magnificent Pennsylvania Station.2" In
the early r96os, Pennsylvania Railroad decided that its property under
Pennsylvania Station would be more valuable if the station were
destroyed and replaced with a modem sports, entertainment, and office
building complex."' Despite much outcry,2" the railroad tore down
Pennsylvania Station, replaced it with a charmless below-ground station,
and erected Madison Square Gardens and two office buildings above it.2"2
The 1965 New York City landmarks preservation law at issue in Penn
Central was a direct result of the railroad's destruction of Pennsylvania
Station."3 The city designated Grand Central Terminal as a landmark
only four years later, in 1967."4 Penn Central opposed the designation
but did not then appeal the decision."5 A year later, still facing financial
ruin, Pennsylvania Railroad merged with New York Central Railroad to
become Penn Central Railroad. I The new railroad company applied for
permission in 1968 to build a fifty-five story office tower atop Grand
Central Terminal."7 One of the proposed plans for the skyscraper would
208. See Brief on Appeal-Appellant at I, Glass v. Goeckel, 703 N.W.2d 58 (Mich. 2005) (No.
126409).
209. See STEPHEN SALSBURY, No WAY TO RUN A RAILROAD: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE PENN
CENTRAL CRISIS 58-59 (1982).
210. Id.
211. E.g., Editorial, Farewell to Penn Station, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1963, at 38 ("Any city gets what
it admires, will pay for, and, ultimately, deserves.... And we will probably be judged not by the
monuments we build but by those we have destroyed."); Christopher Gray, The Destruction of Penn
Station: A 196os Protest That Tried to Save a Piece of the Past, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2ooi, at RE9.
212. SALSBURY, supra note 209.
213. KURT C. SCHLICHTING, GRAND CENTRAL TERMINAL: RAILROADS, ENGINEERING, AND
ARCHITECTURE IN NEW YORK CITY 203-05 (200i). The ordinance states that "the protection ...
perpetuation and use of improvements ... of special character or special historical or aesthetic interest
or value is a public necessity...." NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE tit. 25, ch. 3, § 25-30ib (2005).
214. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 115-6.
215. David Bonderman, The Grand Central Terminal Litigation and the Development of
Preservation Law, in GRAND CENTRAL TERMINAL: CITY WITHIN THE CITY 132, (Deborah Nevins ed.,
1982).
216. SALSBURY, supra note 209, at 99-117.
217. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 16-IT7; SCHLICHTNG, supra note 213, at 203.
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have destroyed a portion of the interior concourse, the other would also
have destroyed the terminal's faqade.2' The Court may have rejected
Penn Central's taking claim in part because it concluded the railroad
could not have had any reasonable expectation, investment-backed or
otherwise, that it would be allowed to tear down Grand Central Terminal
in light of the furor that had accompanied its demolition of Pennsylvania
Station only five years earlier.9 Then-Congressman Edward Koch, the
American Institute of Architects, the President of the City Council, and
others all testified at hearings against the tower."' After the New York
City Landmarks Preservation Commission rejected Penn Central's
proposals, the railroad litigated its Fifth Amendment takings claim that
led the case to the United States Supreme Court.22' Given the railroad's
recent history, it is not beyond question that the railroad's takings claim
was little more than an attempt to extort money from the city.
The historical context of Glass could be a factor in the Michigan
Supreme Court's insistence that its decision was not a taking. Glass was a
seventy-year-old widow who had owned her property across the highway
from the Goeckels for almost forty years.2 Her brief paints an appealing
picture of her use of the picturesque, sandy shores of Lake Huron: "Over
the years since 1967, [Glass], her children, and her grandchildren have at
times used the beach portion of the easement for sunbathing and
lounging, and have always used the easement to access the shore of Lake
Huron to walk the beach." ' In contrast, the Goeckels are newcomers,
having bought the land less than ten years ago. Richard Goeckel soon
began to interfere with Glass's use of the easement by harassing her and
her family as they passed through his property. 4 Notwithstanding his
counterclaim for trespass against Glass, Goeckel testified in a deposition
that he and others habitually walked along the beach on dry sand above
the line of wet sand, on his and others' property, and that others
customarily did the same." The defendant's briefs focused on legal
issues and did not strongly rebut this not-very-sympathetic
characterization of Richard Goeckel as a man who would harass an
elderly widow as she wends her way to the western shore of Lake
218. Bonderman, supra note 215, at 132.
219. For descriptions of the outcry at the destruction of Pennsylvania Station, see generally
LORRAINE B. DIEHL, THE LATE GREAT PENNSYLVANIA STATION (1985). See also Jacqueline Kennedy
Onassis, foreword to GRAND CENTRAL TERMINAL: CITY WITHIN THE CITY, supra note 215, at 8-9.
220. Bonderman, supra note 215, at 132.
221. Id.
222. See Brief on Appeal-Appellant at i, Glass v. Goeckel, 703 N.W.2d 58 (Mich. 2005) (No.
126409).
223. Id.
224. Id. at 1-2.
225. Id. at 3.
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Huron."' Just as it did in Penn Central, the historical context may have
played a quiet role in helping the Michigan Supreme Court decide that
its judgment did not amount to a taking. In contrast to Penn Central,
however, the government action in Glass effected a taking of private
property for public use without just compensation.
CONCLUSION
This Note has argued that the Michigan Supreme Court's recent
decision in Glass changed the boundary of all Michigan private
beachfront property on the shores of the Great Lakes. By using the
public trust doctrine as a tool to redefine the landward edge of the public
trust area, the court has permitted members of the public to walk on
thousands of miles of private beaches up to the ordinary high-water mark
and thereby thwarted the reasonable expectations of landowners. This
decision overturned sub silentio decades of Michigan common law, and it
illustrates one of the untoward and unconstitutional effects of the
application of the public trust doctrine.
What is at stake here is the effect of the Michigan Supreme Court's
conversion of thousands of acres of private littoral land to state property
under the guise of public use rights. Given the lack of compensation (and
clarity) in the court's decision, the Michigan real estate and tourism
industries are likely to be disrupted, just as they were ninety years ago
during the era of the Kavanaugh cases. The taking will only grow as the
waters in Lakes Michigan and Huron continue to recede. 27 Glass will
convert more and more relicted acreage from exclusively private to
public ownership, without compensation, though probably not without
conflict and litigation. Indeed, some in Michigan are worried that the
public might misconstrue Glass and believe that it allows them to
sunbathe on any Michigan beach."8
By allowing the decision in Glass to stand, the Supreme Court has
authorized states to continue the abuse of the public trust doctrine and
achieve an end-run around takings protections. If a state court can simply
declare that its decision does not amount to a taking because there was
really no private property to be taken, states will be given an incentive to
use their courts to circumvent the Fifth Amendment and seize private
property without facing the burden (and the constitutional mandate) of
paying for it. As Glass arguably violates the Fifth Amendment's
prohibition on the taking of private property for public use without just
226. Brief on Appeal-Appellees at 4-6, Glass, 703 N.W.2d 58 (No. 126409).
227. Hugh McDairmid Jr., Riverbed Gouging Takes Great Lakes Down a Foot, DETRorr FREE
PRESS, Jan. 25, 2005 (explaining that "Lake Michigan and Lake Huron have permanently lost a foot of
water" because of erosion in the river that drains them, and that "the decline will continue for the
foreseeable future"); see also Hupp, supra note 2, at 42.
228. Tresa Baldas, Battles Brew over Beaches, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 29, 2005, at 18.
[Vol. 58:1o95
CREATIVE JUDICIAL MISUNDERSTANDING
compensation, the Michigan Supreme Court and the United States
Supreme Court both erred by not requiring Michigan to compensate the
Goeckels for conscripting their property for public use. "Once a court
determines that a taking has occurred, the government retains [a] whole
range of options. ' 29 It may amend or rescind the action that created the
taking, or exercise eminent domain. 3 However, "no subsequent action
by the government can relieve it of the duty to provide compensation for
the period during which the taking was effective.'. 3 Because of the
United States Supreme Court's denial of they Goeckels' petition for
certiorari, the Goeckels alone are forced "to bear public burdens which,
in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.''.
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